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Abstract 
Effective response to information security incidents is a critical function of modern organisations. However, recent 
studies have indicated that organisations have adopted a narrow and technical view of incident response (IR), focusing 
on the immediate concern of detection and subsequent corrective actions. Although some reflection on the IR process 
may be involved, it is typically limited to technical issues and does not leverage opportunities to learn about the 
organisational security threat environment and to adapt incident response capabilities. Given the science of incident 
response is rooted in practice, it is not surprising that the same criticisms can be applied to much of IR literature. 
However, a review of literature in the area of organisational learning suggests that improvements can be made to the 
incident response process. This paper proposes that future incident response research must incorporate a learning focus, 
improve feedback timing on learning activities, facilitate double-loop learning and incorporate an informal learning 
perspective within both formal, procedural incident response processes as well as unstructured, informal environments. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Security incident response is a critical process, ensuring that organisations have a capability to effective respond to, 
eradicate, recover from and learn from security attacks perpetrated against them. The ultimate goal is to minimise the 
effects of a successful attack and to ensure an expedient recovery (van Wyk et al, 2001; Wiik et al, 2005). Successful 
security incidents can cost organisations severely across a variety of impact criteria, including reputation, productivity 
and direct financial costs attributed to lost business as well as legal and regulatory penalties. Standard incident response 
methodologies exist for organisations to use in their response to security incidents across a wide range of impact 
severities (eg. Northcutt, 1998; West-Brown et al, 2003; Grance et al, 2004; Murray, 2007).  
 
A seminal report by Knight & Pretty (1996) established a direct causal relationship between organisations that 
successfully recovered from catastrophes and their effective response to the incident. In fact, the paper asserts that the 
perceived success of the incident response was a more significant factor in share-value recovery than whether catastrophe 
insurance was used to limit negative impact. Further, although not all incidents necessarily turn into catastrophes, the 
ability of an organisation to effectively mitigate an incident plays a key role in preventing incidents from escalating into a 
catastrophe.  
 
There are many factors that determine effectiveness of incident response. Among these are resourcing of the incident 
response capability, availability and application of technical expertise, and support from senior management. These 
factors are duly noted in the standard incident response methodologies available in the public domain (SANS and NIST 
references here). However, at least one expert has pointed out that one of the biggest mistakes in the practice of incident 
response is the lack of effective learning (Chuvakin, 2005).  
 
Recent studies reinforce this observation, indicating that organisations have adopted a narrow and technical view of IR, 
focusing on the immediate concern of detection and subsequent corrective actions. Although standard incident response 
methodologies incorporate a ‘feedback’ or ‘follow-up’ phase where lessons are to be learned, reflection on IR is typically 
limited to the technical process and does not leverage opportunities to learn about the security threat environment and 
effectiveness of internal procedures, controls, training and policies in order to strengthen the organisation's incident 
response capabilities (Cooke, 2003; Hadgkiss, 2006). 
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A key activity in the incident response process is the capacity of the process to learn from the errors or mistakes made 
during the incident, learn which policies and activities are effective or ineffective, identify concerns in staffing and skills 
and to feed this knowledge back into the process (Northcutt, 1998; Killcrece et al, 2003; Grance et al, 2004). While major 
incident response methods such as the SANS and NIST models include 'post-mortem' or 'follow-up' activities post-
incident, there is little evidence to suggest that organisations actively engage in adequate organisational learning and 
improvement of these incident response processes (Cooke, 2003). Current incident response literature instead focuses 
upon technical responses to incidents, the initial phases of the process and forensic activities (Mitropolous et al, 2006; 
Turner, 2007; Zhang et al, 2009). However, if organisations were to appropriately learn from and manage their incident 
response capability, they would be able to leverage opportunities to learn from incidents to their best advantage and 
realise the benefits of a robust process and fortified security strategy. 
 
Organisational learning literature can be used to develop deeper insights into how incident learning activities can be 
examined and improved. They outline and detail how organisations are able to effectively learn from events and 
modifying behaviours to adapt to changes in their environments (Fiol & Lyles, 1985; Huber, 1991). The effects of a 
capable learning organisation are lower turnaround times, a greater capacity to deal with change in the organisational 
environment and innovative strategies (Goh, 1998). However, work conducted in incident learning (Cooke, 2003; 
Hadgkiss, 2006; Muhren et al, 2008) has attested that organisations are not effectively learning through their incident 
response capabilities, despite the detailed actions that should be taken during post-mortem phases of the SANS and NIST 
incident response models. Muhren et al (2008) describes how 'considerable opportunities remain unseized' in this space. 
 
This paper will subsequently present a literature review of incident response and organisational learning literature, 
outlining security incident response processes, how organisations learn effectively and the importance of double-loop 
learning. A series of propositions will be presented, suggesting that the incident response process must have adequate 
knowledge capturing methods to ensure quicker turnaround times for learning, feature the application of double-loop 
learning to question fundamental processes and principles and that learning processes must ensure that both formal and 
informal learning methods are applied. 
 
INCIDENT RESPONSE METHODS AND INCIDENT LEARNING 
 
Incident response refers to the formal, structured methods by which organisations engage teams to detect and eradicate 
information security incidents (West-Brown, 2003; Wiik et al, 2005). Incident response teams are the 'firefighters' within 
organisations, devoted to the preparation, identification, analysis and recovery from security incidents (Jaikumar, 2002). 
On the timeline of business continuity, incident response is the immediate action taking to a security breach, whereas 
disaster recovery and business continuity are longer-term concerns (Whitman & Mattord, 2005). Incident response is 
therefore the considerations and actions undertaken upon the detection of the security incident and the immediate actions 
taken in the short-term to reduce the organisation's exposure.  
 
However, a security incident response team is responsible for more than just direct actions against incidents. Instead, 
such teams will actively advise on security, develop security policy and conduct security training and awareness 
programs (West-Brown et al, 2003). Therefore, the value of fielding effective and capable incident response teams is that 
they will firstly be effective in their response to security breaches. However, in their wider organisational role, incident 
response teams can provide knowledge and information to the organisation as a whole. An incident response team must 
have a variety of qualities, including technical skill, organisational skill and diplomatic skill in dealing both with the 
incident, management of the team and effective at negotiating during heated and stressful situations. 
 
There are several published incident response processes that organisations may follow, including the SANS and NIST 
SP800-61 methods. Both methods offer a similar approach in responding to and treating incidents. The methods centre 
around a common process, incorporating initial preparatory phases, the detection and containment of incidents, recovery 
from incidents and a 'post-mortem' analysis. Specifically, the SANS method features six steps: preparation, identification, 
containment, eradication, recovery and lessons learned (Northcutt, 1998; Murray, 2007). The NIST 800-61 model 
follows an iteration of four steps: preparation, detection and analysis, containment, eradication and recovery and post-
incident activities (Killcrece, 2003; Grance et al, 2004). Ultimately, both models perform the same functions through a 
similar process, encapsulating preparatory actions before an incident occurs, the identification and analysis of the 
incident, attempts to contain the spread of the incident, to remove the incident from the organisation's systems, restore 
original operations and engage a learning process (Kossakowski et al, 1999; Osborne, 2001; Kelver, 2002; West-Brown 
et al, 2003; Mitropolous et al, 2006). Figure 1 demonstrates a synthesis of this incident response process.  
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Figure 1: the Incident Response Process (Mitropolous et al, 2006) 
 
This process aims to firstly establish preventative measures, identify when an incident actually occurs, contain the 
incident, remove the incident, facilitate recovery of organisational systems and networks and conduct a post-mortem 
review to establish key learning notes. Table 1 further describes the phases of the incident response process in further 
detail. 
 
Phase Description 
Preparation The preparation phase is where preventative measures such as security 
policies and threat models are established. A 'response kit' is built, featuring 
tools that will be used to assist during an incident, such as USB jump 
drives, laptops, software, stationary and cabling There is also an emphasis 
on proactive prevention of incidents through effective patch management 
and user security awareness training. 
Identification When an incident occurs, identification procedures are engaged, 
determining whether an incident exists. Here, the incident should be 
validated, the scope and potential impact determined and how the incident 
occurred. 
Containment Once the incident has been identified, it must be contained. This will 
attempt to ensure that the incident does not worsen. Two key objectives are 
present under containment: the prevention of further contamination of the 
system and the preservation of evidence for potential future legal 
proceedings. The incident response team must contain the incident so that it 
does not spread across the organisation's systems and network. 
Eradication Eradication activities attempt to clean up after the incident, based on the 
information gathered on the incident. The team will attempt to neutralise 
the attack (eg. deleting malicious code). 
Recovery Recovery concerns the transfer of the system back into regular 
organisational use, though with monitoring and involvement from business 
heads to ensure that the system operates smoothly. 
Follow-Up the incident response team will validate and improve the incident handling 
process. This will involve the completion of incident reports, presentation 
of these reports to management, improvement of the incident response 
process from technical and managerial perspectives and to define a strategy 
and plan for implementing these changes. 
Table 1: Description of Incident Response Phases (Northcutt, 1998; Kelver, 2002; Killcrece, 2003; West-Brown et al, 
2003; Grance et al, 2004; Murray, 2007) 
 
Incident response literature shows a disposition towards the technical aspects of intrusions and their eradication 
(Mitropolous et al, 2006; Novak, 2007; Turner, 2007). Additionally, there is a strong tendency in incident response 
literature to focus more on the initial phases of incident response over incident learning (Mitropolous et al, 2006; Zhang 
et al, 2009). Incident response methods are recognised as being tightly coupled with digital forensics (Mandia & Procise, 
2002; Novak, 2007), whereby the focus is not upon effective learning and the knowledge gain post-incident. Rather, a 
digital forensics focus on incident response will lead to an emphasis on technical competence in responding to incidents 
and the capability of tracing the incident back to its perpetrator for legal processing (Mitropolous et al, 2006). 
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This technical perspective is consistent with the assertions by Dhillon & Backhouse (2001), Siponen (2005), Shedden et 
al (2011) and Zafar & Clark (2009) that highlight how current security research is focused upon the technical elements of 
security and security models rather than socio-organisational issues. Current security methods and models tend to present 
a focus on the IT infrastructure of organisations, technical risks and technical controls without focusing on humans and 
practice (Dhillon & Backhouse, 2001; Spears, 2006; Zafar & Clark, 2009). However, these socio-organisational 
perspectives have the capacity to offer unique insight into security methods, beyond the technical, systematic space and 
into the 'murky' reality of business and security practice (Brown & Duguid, 2002; Shedden et al, 2009). 
 
The concept of a 'post-mortem' or 'follow-up' phase in incident response has achieved little attention in current literature. 
It is evident that effective incident response is not a pure technical concern as is currently appreciated. The focus is 
currently upon forensic, technical and procedural perspectives. However, incident response methods are an iterative 
learning process that must allow for the flow of information into its phases in order to build the expertise and knowledge 
base of the individuals. Although learning is a key feature of every fundamental IR model given the presence of feedback 
loops, knowledge management and learning are not given much attention in literature. Further, the scope of incident 
learning has never been explicitly defined.  
 
Effective learning from incidents will feed back into the procedures followed, the information received by the incident 
response team and will identify actions, steps and activities that may have inhibited the recovery of the organisation. 
Feeding this information back to the organisation's preparedness phase will fortify policies, determine if additional tools 
are required, increase security budgets, improve training programs and lead to alterations to the incident response 
procedures, activities and processes themselves.  
 
The post-mortem activities typically consist of analysis and reporting based on the incident, actions taken, what worked 
and how the incident response procedures and responses could be improved (Kelver, 2002). Incident learning is usually 
enacted through a series of formal reports, meetings and presentations to management (Northcutt, 1998; Grance et al, 
2004). Meetings are held and communicative notes are gathered to address responses, disagreements, suggestions and 
additions to security policies and the incident procedures (Northcutt, 1998). Issues to document include an estimation of 
the damage caused, actions taken during the incident, policies and procedures that require an update and any electronic 
evidence that can be used for pursuing those responsible (Mitropolous et al, 2006). The response to these lessons learned 
should cycle relevant knowledge and changes into the procedures for the incident response process, training processes for 
the incident response team, improving the incident response policies and procedures and the creation of further reference 
material on how to respond to similar incidents (Grance et al, 2004). Such activities effectively feed information back to 
the preparedness phase as shown in Figure 1 in order to reduce the likelihood of that incident occurring again (Osborne, 
2001). 
 
Incident response post-mortem reviews are in need of further study. More research is required to establish how 
organisations can effectively learn from the incident response process, despite the apparent focus on technical intrusion 
detection and the initial phases of the incident response process. As both the NIST 800-61 and SANS model demonstrate, 
it is imperative that key learning notes are documented, reviewed, presented and integrated back into the incident 
response process for future improvement. However, it is unsure as to how organisations can effectively learn and respond 
to this information. 
 
ORGANISATIONAL LEARNING FOR INCIDENT RESPONSE 
 
Organisational learning as a field of research examines how organisations are able to develop knowledge and 'routines' in 
order to guide their behaviours (Levitt & March, 1988). Organisational learning is a process, whereby organisations aim 
to incorporate and disseminate valuable experience and knowledge across its communities of practice over time, updating 
and replacing 'organisational memory' (Huber, 1991). Learning takes place through a variety of stimuli in order to correct 
errors, develop a new knowledge base, gain competitive advantage through innovation and reduce the time it takes to 
undertake actions and make decisions (Argyris & Schon, 1978; Shrivastava; 1983; Huber, 1991). The more an 
organisation is willing to learn and incorporate new knowledge and insight into its 'organisational memory', the more 
agile the organisation will be when faced with unknown situations and the likelihood of errors made in decisions and 
actions will be reduced. A learning organisation is described as being skilled at creating, acquiring and transferring its 
knowledge, modifying behaviours in order to reflect the new insights gained (Sinkula et al, 1997). 
 
Organisational Learning Processes 
 
Organisational learning is accomplished across a variety of processes, perspectives and methods. Organisations learn by 
encoding inferences from its own history into 'routines' (Levitt & March, 1988). These routines then guide behaviour 
among the organisation's communities of practice through forms, rules, procedures and strategies. There are several 
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views on how organisations learn: through direct knowledge acquisition, information distribution, information 
interpretation and organisational memory (Huber, 1991). Organisations can learn through direct experience, through 
interpreting the experiences of others and a history of events and through encoding knowledge and information into 
organisational memory (Levitt & March, 1988). These perspectives illustrate that organisations can learn through 
planned learning practices, directly seeking information through surveys and research, by distributing information across 
its communities of practice, govern how this information is best framed and interpreted and how the learning notes, 
information or knowledge is stored (Levitt & March, 1988; Huber, 1991).  
 
Organisations also learn through four perspectives. These are adaptation, assumption sharing, development of knowledge 
base and institutionalised experience (Shrivastava, 1983). Adaptation outlines how organisations adapt to changes in their 
environment over time, adjusting behaviour to remain competitive (Cyert & March, 1963; Cangelosi & Dill, 1965; 
March & Olsen, 1976). Assumption sharing refers to how organisations respond to change within their internal and 
external environments, detecting and correcting errors (Argyris & Schon, 1978; Mitroff & Emshoff, 1979). This is 
performed through the sharing of assumptions and mental 'maps' between individuals. The development of a knowledge 
base is the process by which organisations build knowledge based upon the actions, outcomes and effects that these 
actions have had on their internal and external environment (Duncan & Weiss, 1978; Shrivastava, 1983). Institutionalised 
experience involves learning by doing, subsequently reducing the time it takes to produce goods and make decisions due 
to the repetition of activities over time (Abernathy & Wayne, 1974). 
 
These learning processes are important when planning incident learning activities within the incident response capability. 
Current incident learning procedures and guidelines are action-oriented, focused upon the scheduling of meetings and the 
creation of reports. There is, however, no comprehensive or recognised meta-structure or learning model situated beyond 
this. Current incident learning literature focuses upon the acquisition of direct knowledge from staff involved in the 
incident and the distribution of this information to select parties. However, there are a wide range of direct knowledge 
acquisition processes available, including experiments, self-appraisals, experiments, unsystematic learning, vicarious 
learning, searching and noticing and grafting (Huber, 1991). There are also broader recommendations for comprehensive 
information dissemination to enable broad organisational learning that have not been actioned in incident learning 
(Huber, 1991). Information interpretation must be considered in how the incident information is assigned meaning by 
other staff,  including the rapidity of feedback, the individual's personal knowledge and how they frame or view a 
problem. Organisational memory must also be considered - ie. how the organisation stores and retrieves that information 
over time (Levitt & McEvoy, 1988). An incident knowledge database can subsequently be used to store past incident 
data, successful actions and key learning notes.  
 
Effective organisational learning, when combined with the post-mortem reviews of incident response processes provide 
an area for leverage. Simon (1991) describes how effective learning organisations are capable of innovation, assimilating 
new ideas and fighting 'entropy'. Shrivastava (1983) and Levit & March (1988) highlight that organisational learning can 
allow for the effective institutionalisation of cumulative experience, reducing the time it takes to produce goods and 
make effective decisions due to the repetition of activities over time. Ultimately, organisations must learn and 'unlearn' 
knowledge in order to reflect and adjust to its changing environment (Fiol & Lyles, 1985). Doing so will permit 
flexibility in their strategy, competitive advantage, a healthy corporate culture conducive to learning and an 
organisational structure that will permit innovation and the development of new insight. When related to incident 
response, the benefits of effective learning can be seen, potentially increasing agility and flexibility in process, increasing 
accuracy in decision-making, increasing efficiency in the incident response process and a wider understanding of security 
incidents and appropriate issues distributed among the incident response team due to the  ingestation of a wider body of 
knowledge. 
 
Single- and Double-Loop Learning Perspectives in Incident Learning 
 
Through effective learning, organisations are able to detect and correct errors and issues within their structures, processes 
and activities in order to either carry on present policies or to question their underlying structures as a precursor to 
change (Agyris, 1976; McElroy, 1999). This discussion refers to the notion of single-loop and double-loop learning.  
 
Single-loop learning is concerned with a more narrow and short-term focus concerning an organisation's 'action 
strategies', or those plans and rules that enforce organisation structures and beliefs. This is the position of most 
organisations (Rowe, 1996). An example, in the context of incident response, would be modifying the implementation of 
a control to better enforce a security policy.  
 
In order for effective organisational learning to actually occur, organisations must focus on double-loop learning (Agyris, 
1976). Double-loop learning questions the fundamental governing variables of the organisation behind its actions. The 
underlying rules, principles and knowledge of organisations will be challenged, leading to the 'active construction' of 
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different actions to take and rules to follow (Agyris, 1976; McElroy, 1999). When using double-loop learning, 
organisations will reconsider and alter their fundamental rules, policies, systems and processes in order to promote long-
term change (van Niekerk & von Solms, 2004). Questioning the fundamental principles of policies and incorporating 
deep conceptual changes as part of a wider security change strategy is evidence of double-loop learning. 
 
The difference between single-loop and double-loop learning is important when learning from incidents. Figure 2 
illustrates this difference, highlighting that single loop learning will only establish specific actions in response to an 
issue.  
 
Figure 2: Organisational Learning for Incident Response (van Niekerk & von Solms, 2004) 
 
The Informal Nature of Organisational Learning, Knowledge and Practice 
 
Another important delineation within organisational learning refers to the formal and informal nature of learning. The 
concept of the 'informal' organisation refers to the understanding that, despite formalised structures, procedures and 
policy, an informal culture and routines will exist. The informal organisation consists of those activities not specified or 
represented in the official blueprints of the formal organisation (Scott, 1961). The informal organisation is represented by 
those communities, behaviours and actions that are not officially recognised by the formal organisation structures, but are 
still integral to the function of the formal organisation (Farris, 1979; Simon, 1979). Informal working communities, 
networks of individuals and knowledge, informal practices, workarounds and the like are all representative of the 
informal organisation. 
 
Brown & Duguid (2002) describe the concept of business 'practice' and the informal organisation, whereby organisations 
and process can be viewed as 'machines' that are predictable in their behaviours and routines. However, the 'real view' of 
organisations are that they can be unpredictable and 'messy' (Shedden et al, 2009; Shedden et al, 2011). Parties must 
collaborate unofficially, share information, tell stories, share experiences and improvise in order to achieve their work 
goals. Organisational members will indulge not only in formalised process, but will also aim to find shortcuts and 
workarounds (Sasse & Flachais, 2005). Those informal organisational routines populated and acted upon via effective 
organisational learning infrastructures will include structures of beliefs, frameworks, paradigms, codes, cultures and 
knowledge that support formal routines (Levitt & March, 1988). 
 
These routines can be transferred through formal means, such as education, mergers and personnel movement; however, 
informal learning will occur through socialisation within teams, imitation of others with more experience and 
'professionalisation'. When examining organisational and individual learning and knowledge, Davenport & Prusak 
(1998), Brown & Duguid (2001) and Hislop (2009) outline that knowledge is informally embedded within the processes 
and practices of organisations. Though the formalised variants of learning and knowledge embedded through policy and 
training will exist, there will be a parallel and related level of learning via informal means through process and 
participation. Therefore, it is suggested in literature that effective organisational learning can be performed through 
formal classes, procedures, process and events, but informal learning mechanisms are just as critical (Shrivastava, 1983). 
 
Though formal mechanisms of learning and change can be incorporated and are more likely to be recognised by 
organisations, an effective incident learning process must incorporate an informal focus as well. Formal training 
programs, alterations in policy and knowledge management systems are capable of capturing official records and 
perspectives. However, the focus in current incident response methods such as the NIST and SANS models ignore the 
'soft side' of learning. That is, they do not leverage the workarounds, informal networks and workarounds that people 
pursue in conjunction with formal aspects of learning. Effective learning must therefore recognise and leverage those 
unofficial activities and networks of knowledge in addition to the formal mechanisms in order to best learn from and 
respond to future incidents.  
 
Informal practice considerations are critical when learning from security incidents. Incident response occurs in stressful 
environments with a heavy emphasis on teamwork. Under such circumstances, workarounds and informal activities or 
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procedures will occur: Muhren et al (2008) demonstrates that during incidents, individuals default to their own informal 
networks of knowledge and procedures even though incident response processes may be highly structured.  
 
Therefore, incident response will require both formal and informal learning activities and strategies in order to 
complement and reinforce the knowledge gained from incident learning. This is important for effective, holistic learning 
given Farris' (1979) and Shrivastava's (1983) assertions that informal learning and practice will support formal learning. 
Furthermore, recognising and reinforcing informal practices, knowledge and workarounds can enhance an organisation's 
ability to learn from incidents and improve future incident response. As Muhren et al (2008) has shown, incident 
response team members can successfully be given the freedom to pursue their own workarounds outside formalised 
structure. That is, informal practices can be leveraged to more effectively respond to incidents rather than pure reliance 
on formalised procedures. Building in flexibility and reinforcing informal avenues of knowledge acquisition, analysis and 
decision-making can lead to a more effective incident response capability. 
 
PROMOTING LEARNING IN THE INCIDENT RESPONSE PROCESS 
 
An effective incident response process must incorporate a learning strategy. Though quality incident response processes 
must ensure that they prepare, identify and eradicate incidents, the importance of post-mortems must be recognised. 
Effective post-mortem activities lead to the strengthening of organisational security policies, security management, 
improved training programs and alterations to incident response activities. The effects of learning through incident 
response has been demonstrated to avert major attacks and to lead to improvements to the incident response method as a 
whole (Melara et al, 2003; Stephenson, 2003). 
 
This paper suggests that further research must be conducted to promote organisational learning research and theory in the 
context of incident learning activities. Currently, incident learning is focused upon activity-level procedures and 
recommendations. There are no higher learning models and processes associated with incident learning. Organisational 
learning literature provides a series of learning models and processes that can be incorporated into a meta-level incident 
learning method. This could be used to develop a holistic, insightful and comprehensive incident learning model that 
could acquire knowledge and insight across a variety of processes, disseminate the findings in a structured and 
recognised manner and store this information in organisational memory. In doing so, double-loop learning should be 
incorporated into incident response methods in order to gain comprehensive learning and feedback on the base structures 
and principles of the model itself, in addition to the activities, polices, management structures, tools and staff in the 
incident response process. There is the need to improve the expediency in incident response process feedback, moving 
away from an 'after the fact' approach as is the current norm and to move towards a more agile approach. Finally, the 
current emphasis is on providing feedback and learning through formal policy, presentation and reports. However, there 
is the need to recognise informal learning approaches and mechanisms prevalent in all organisations and incident 
response processes. These views are encapsulated in subsequent sections. 
 
The incorporation of these propositions into existing models has the potential to significantly impact incident response 
methods. These perspectives will alter the incident learning activities conducted within the final phase of the method 
found in Figure 1. The application of organisational learning processes may lead to higher-level structures that would 
surround or sit above the incident response process. Faster turnaround in feedback may lead to additional learning loops 
in each phase, linking to the initial preparation phase but also to each independent phase. This view ensures that 
organisations are capable of learning from incidents during the activities, feeding this information and learning directly 
back to the incident response team at the time. However, formalised methods of incident response may change 
completely when considering unstructured incident response methods and informal learning. 
 
Organisational Learning Strategies and Incident Learning 
 
It is hence suggested that effective incident response processes must lean on organisational learning practices throughout 
the process. The current linear models loop back to the initial stage of the process in order to conduct post-mortem 
meetings, as demonstrated in Figure 1. Current methods are also focused on pinpoint activities to operate rather than 
providing comprehensive learning strategies and wide-perspective learning models. Little research has been conducted in 
examining effective learning activities and how to improve incident response activities. Cooke (2003) and van Niekerk & 
von Solms (2004) outline double-loop learning as a means of effectively gaining knowledge from security incidents. 
These studies aim to feed the consequences of an incident back through to improve the underlying organisational policies 
and security processes, improving the incident response capability as a whole.  
 
For effective organisational learning to occur, there must be a higher-level view of incident learning utilising the models 
and processes from literature. This will in turn lead to a systematic, structured and comprehensive strategy for effective 
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incident learning. Organisational learning theory states that individuals and groups must adopt direct knowledge 
acquisition, information distribution, information interpretation and also consider the effects of organisational memory 
(Huber, 1991). From an incident learning perspective, relevant knowledge and information must be shared among 
relevant parties and dispersed through relevant functions in order to enable double-loop learning systems in the first 
instance and to subsequently improve incident learning processes, management, response times, procedures, manuals and 
training. The effective consideration of organisational learning effects such as effective knowledge acquisition and 
information distribution will allow organisations to obtain knowledge across departments and spread this knowledge and 
information throughout the organisation to any relevant party. The encoding of relevant information and knowledge into 
a repository and back into its routines will ensure that they exist in organisational memory. Therefore, we suggest that: 
 
Proposition 1: incident learning models must be developed to appropriately map effective organisational 
learning processes to incident response. 
 
Double-Loop Incident Learning 
 
Double-loop learning is critical for incident learning activities. Learning models from Agyris (1976), Agyris & Schon 
(1977), Cooke (2003) and van Niekerk & von Solms (2004) emphasise the use of double-loop, generative learning over 
single-loop learning. Double-loop learning is crucial for the incident response process, ensuring that base values, policies 
and strategies are brought to question, possibly resulting in the redevelopment of ideals, culture, strategy, policies and 
procedures at a base level. By contrast, single loop learning attempts to invoke responses to shift or alter current policies, 
focusing upon the immediate actions (van Niekerk & von Solms, 2004). McElroy (1999) links double-loop learning to 
'2nd generation knowledge management', articulating that double-loop learning deals with the creation of knowledge 
itself, propagating this knowledge through formal and internal channels to update and refresh norms at a fundamental 
level.  
 
However, while double-loop learning is indeed critical for incident response, how incident response teams actually learn 
from incidents and manage this knowledge is unclear. As previously mentioned, most incident response literature focuses 
upon technical intrusion types and specific technological controls. There are few studies that specifically discuss how 
organisations learn and adapt their incident response processes and activities in the wake of attacks, barring the incident 
response methodology literature themselves. Therefore, this paper makes the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 2: double-loop learning must be facilitated in incident learning activities to ensure that not 
only plans and policies are questioned, but their underlying structures and 'governing variables'. 
 
An interesting role for IR processes relates to security risk management. The values assigned to the probability and 
impact of individual risks is typically ‘gut-feel’ or hypothetical. Incident response can be a source of concrete data, 
reflecting what is actually happening in the organisation. This data can be used to inform the risk assessment process 
resulting in much more accurate risk assessments and subsequent strategies. However, this facility will only be available 
if organisations take the necessary steps to learn from incidents and provide feedback into related organisational security 
processes such as security risk management.  
 
Agility in Incident Learning Feedback 
 
Greater speed and agility in learning from incidents and of the incident response activities is required. The current 
emphasis of current incident learning is to engage formal learning mechanisms ‘after the fact’, or upon completion of an 
incident. However, feeding such information back post-incident may result in an erosion of knowledge and insight if left 
for too long (Northcutt, 1998). Greater speed in response is necessary to ensure that all relevant information, key learning 
notes and knowledge are captured and disseminated to the team as quickly as possible, perhaps even as the incident 
occurs. Through faster turnaround of feedback during incidents, relevant insight and knowledge can be gained to be used 
in order to reinterpret how incident response is performed. This in turn may improve incident response procedures and 
practices with greater expediency, leading to the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 3: organisations must incorporate feedback from incident learning activities through shorter 
learning cycle turnarounds. 
 
The Need to Incorporate Informal Approaches in Incident Learning 
 
Organisational responses to major incidents tend to be haphazard and complex (Northcutt, 1998). It is known in incidents 
that individuals will revert to their personal networks, skills and knowledge when responding to stressful events during 
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the course of an incident (Welks, 2003; Muhren et al, 2008). Formal mechanisms such as process and procedure can and 
often do break down due to the evolving and difficult environments created by such incidents.  
 
In informal environments, formal learning processes may not be effective in isolation as individuals will need to support 
formal knowledge and learning mechanisms with informal learning. Muhren et al (2008) illustrates how individuals can 
effectively leverage informal knowledge throughout the organisation when responding to incidents. Specifically within 
high-reliability organisations, it was found that formalised routines and procedures tended to break down during 
incidents. Empowerment of employees was determined to be more effective, permitting greater flexibility and innovation 
when able to leverage their own experience and networks of knowledge, distributed among individuals across the 
organisational structure. Formal learning practices in informal environments such as this must be used in conjunction 
with informal methods that support the informal practices upon which the official process relies upon. 
 
Effective incident learning even in formalised incident response processes and environments must still incorporate an 
informal focus, given that informal 'messy' view of organisational practice embedded in process (Brown & Duguid, 
2002; Shedden et al, 2011). However, current post-mortem activities generally rely on formal reports and presentations to 
articulate the effect of policies, procedures and performance (Grance et al, 2004). While this may be an effective means 
of feeding learning notes and knowledge to security managers and the incident response team, there is the need to 
recognise informal routes for learning to ensure complete and holistic knowledge transfer and understanding. the 
imposition of formalised policy, procedure and management can be performed, there must be opportunity for incident 
response teams to learn through informal networks. Different types of recognised learning procedures and steps can be 
incorporated to promote effective knowledge management and organisational learning through informal procedures, such 
as organisational self-appraisal, unintentional or unsystematic learning and grafting (Huber, 1991). These learning 
mechanisms take the product of group interactions and knowledge discovered through informal, interpersonal networks, 
however unstructured they may be, in order to grow organisational knowledge pools.  
 
Understanding how knowledge is managed and spread at the individual and team levels can assist in the facilitation of 
effective knowledge management and organisational learning. For instance, ‘grafting’ refers to learning by a team 
through the acquisition of a new member, with their own knowledge and insights that can be shared. This individual can 
codify their knowledge, or train others through seminars and personal interactions to scaffold this knowledge across to 
informally improve team procedures and process. Leading from this, we have made the following propositions to suggest 
an informal learning and practice perspective to incident response and incident learning: 
 
Proposition 4: to promote effective and holistic learning, incident learning activities must include formal 
and informal perspectives. This will disseminate key knowledge to management and staff in a 
comprehensive manner, facilitating and assisting formal processes through supportive informal practices. 
 
Proposition 5: incident learning must still occur in environments and situations where incident response 
activities are unstructured and informal (eg. Muhren et al, 2008).  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Current incident follow-up and post-mortem activities represent a critical phase in the incident response process. 
However, incident learning is not a current research focus. Incident learning is currently viewed as a formal mechanism 
for improving organisational security incident response processes and as a source of information, used to improve 
procedures, policies, security training activities and implement new controls. However, current approaches are 
formalised and high-level. Organisational learning literature suggests that the implementation of organisational learning 
processes can result in the realisation of large benefits in incident learning and incident response. Through the 
implementation of organisational learning processes that acquire and make sense of knowledge across a variety of means, 
incident response and security structures can be improved and disseminated. Organisational learning concepts such as 
double-loop learning are also critical to ensure that organisations learn appropriately, not only focused upon short-term 
changes, but are also capable of questioning underlying security and incident response structures to facilitate long-term, 
rigorous change where necessary. Finally, incident learning must be able to incorporate both formal and informal means 
of learning. While current incident learning activities focus upon formalised methods of learning such as meetings, 
presentations and reports, informal learning processes such as socialisation, imitation and the movement, or 'grafting', of 
personnel. Through effective incident learning, organisations will be more capable of managing the incident response 
capability, making improvements where necessary and feeding key learning notes back into security processes, 
management structures, policies and procedures.  
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